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Abstract
Background. At what point does “not telling” become “not knowing”? Previous research shows 
that Alzheimer’s disease (AD) affects people’s ability to define words, primarily, it has been 
thought, because AD destroys the semantic representations of words that the patients can no 
longer define. We investigate an alternative hypothesis, which is the idea that AD affects 
metalinguistic ability, which in turn affects people’s ability to produce good definitions. 
Aims. Does AD affect metalinguistic abilities? Are definitions poor because people lose semantic 
information, or because they lose the knowledge of what constitutes a good definition?
Methods & Procedures. We first  established what constitutes good definitions of a set  of words 
denoting animate and inanimate concepts. We then asked elderly  people with AD to define these 
words. As expected, their definitions were very poor. However, we then asked them forced and 
open-choice questions about the information that they omitted from their definitions.
Outcomes & Results. We show that people with AD can access semantic information that they 
appear to have lost. The AD group  performed significantly worse than control participants on a 
word definition task, but importantly, some of the information they did not provide 
spontaneously was offered after questioning
Conclusions. We conclude that although our participants with AD have lost some semantic 
knowledge, on at least some occasions they do not  provide information that they do still know 
because of a metalinguistic impairment. In particular, the participants with AD no longer 
understand what constitutes a good definition. We argue this metalinguistic impairment results in 
part from frontal atrophy. Our results have the important consequence that just because a person 
with AD does not offer information, even when asked, does not mean that they do not know it.
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I don’t know what I know: Evidence of preserved semantic knowledge metalinguistic deficits in 
adults with probable Alzheimer’s disease
Do people with probable Alzheimer’s disease (AD) know more than they say? The 
apparent loss of knowledge is one of the most striking and distressing aspects of the cognitive 
changes brought about  by progressive disorders such as AD. There has been much debate in the 
literature about whether knowledge is truly  lost or whether it becomes inaccessible (Bayles, 
Tomoeda, Kaszniak & Trosset, 1991; Chertkow & Bub, 1990; Hodges, Salmon & Butters, 1991; 
Nebes, 1989, 1994; Nebes, Martin & Horn, 1984). In this paper we explore an alternative 
hypothesis: that at least some of the time, people with AD still possess and can access some of 
the information that they  appear to have lost, but do not produce it  spontaneously  because they 
no longer fully  understand the demands of the tasks in which they  engage. That is, they possess a 
metalinguistic deficit.
The loss of linguistic abilities is a prominent feature of AD (for reviews see Harley, 1998; 
Nebes, 1989). People with AD show a wide range of language impairments from an early  stage 
of the disease, including word-finding difficulties (Astell & Harley, 1996, 1998; Kempler, 1988), 
poor comprehension (Emery, 1985, 1996), and impoverished discourse (Hutchinson & Jensen, 
1980), although syntactic comprehension and knowledge may remain relatively intact (Rochon, 
Kavé, Cupit, Jokel, & Winocur, 2004).
The wide range of difficulties is not surprising considering the nature of AD pathology: 
given this non-focal and non-uniform pathology, we expect  variable and wide-ranging linguistic 
impairments. Until recently few people have identified frontal-lobe disturbance as a feature of 
early-stage AD, with the general belief being that frontal damage only  manifests later in the 
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progression of AD and only  secondary to more posterior (Broks, Lines, Atchison, Challenor, 
Traub, Foster et al., 1994) and subcortical (hippocampal) damage (Ball, Fisman, Hachinski, 
Blume, Fox, Kral et al., 1985). However, recent studies of executive impairments in AD suggests 
that frontal-lobe damage does in fact occur much earlier than has previously been acknowledged 
(Baddeley, Baddeley, Bucks & Wilcock, 2001; Collette, Nan der Linden & Salmon, 1999; 
Lafleche & Albert, 1995; Perry  & Hodges, 1999). Baudic, Dalla Barba, Thibaudet, Smagghe, 
Remy and Taykov (2006) not only  found evidence of executive impairments in mild AD patients, 
but also found that executive impairments preceded the disturbance of language, attention and 
constructional praxis. Identifying the specific neural underpinnings of executive impairments and 
therefore also identifying which frontal regions are damaged in AD however remains 
problematic. 
Based upon the evidence to date we believe that the frontal-lobe disturbances found in 
AD will ultimately affect metalinguistic processes. We do not however propose to identify the 
exact neural underpinnings of metalinguistic functions. Our proposal of frontal-lobe involvement 
is thus based upon two things. First, metalinguistic abilities clearly draw upon a number of high-
level executive functions such as awareness, theory of mind, monitoring, planning, controlled 
processing and updating (Bialystok & Ryan, 1985; Doherty & Perner, 1998; Gombert, 1992; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1986). These are all cognitive functions that we know to some degree, rely on 
the integrity of the frontal-lobes (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Rympa, Prabhakaran, Desmond, 
Glover & Gabrieli, 1999; Shallice, 2002; Torralva, Kipps, Hodges, Clark, Bekinschtein, et  al., 
2006). Second, because AD results in executive impairments it is reasonable to assume that 
metalinguistic functions will also be affected. However to attempt to localise metalinguistic 
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processes to specific regions of the brain is by its very nature a fruitless exercise. We therefore 
propose that our examination of metalinguistic function will afford us a better understanding of 
how high-level language functions are affected in AD and that the evidence to date provides us 
with reason to believe that executive and frontal-lobe impairments will contribute in some way to 
the metalinguistic disturbance.
Differences among tasks will lead to differences in performance: those tasks that are more 
reliant on conscious access to information, essentially those tasks that  place grater demands on 
executive function, will cause people with AD more problems than tasks that do not place 
demands on executive function.
Although most psycholinguistic research is on automatic language processing (such as 
much of word recognition and production and parsing), language tasks differ in the amount of 
non-automatic processing involved. Automatic language processing is mandatory, fast, and does 
not use general resources. Non-automatic language processing is reliant on conscious access and 
places demands on general resources. Non-automatic processes play  a central role in controlling 
and manipulating automatic language processes. As they involve executive processing, they 
depend on the integrity of the frontal lobes. Hence any pathology that disrupts the frontal lobes 
(such as AD) will affect the efficacy  of the non-automatic processes that control language. We 
know that people with AD are impaired on tasks such as word naming and memory  retrieval that 
have a large automatic component, but much less is known about the effects of AD on non-
automatic language processing. In particular, we do not know if some of the observed semantic 
deficits might result from impaired non-automatic language-control processes.
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Recent evidence shows that AD affects general executive processing (Collette, Delrue, 
Van Der Linden, & Salmon, 2001; Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Graham, Dawson, & Hodges, 
2003), and indeed may do so quite early in the disease (Baudic, Dalla Barba, Thibaudet, 
Smagghe, Remy, & Traykov, 2006). Although there are few overt examinations of non-automatic 
language-control processes within the AD literature, there is clear evidence that such processes 
are affected. For example, people with AD perform consistently poorly  on tests of verbal fluency 
(Butters, Granholm, Salmon, Grant & Wolfe, 1987; Diesfeldt, 1985; Hodges, Salmon & Butters, 
1992; Martin & Feido, 1983). A recent meta-analysis of verbal fluency performance in AD shows 
that the spontaneous generation of items from semantic categories is more difficult than the 
spontaneous productions of letters or phonemes (Henry & Crawford, 2004; Henry, Crawford, & 
Phillips, 2004). Emery (1996) argued that people with AD are more impaired on category-
fluency tasks because these tasks are “meta-naming tasks”. Meta-naming tasks require increased 
levels of awareness, attentional control and monitoring than automatic tasks like confrontation 
naming because they require as many names to be generated as possible from a specific category 
rather than generating a single name or term. This task requires people, among other things, to 
identify suitable items for output, to maintain the strategy of generating as many items as 
possible, to monitor the output to avoid repetition, and to change strategies if the output is 
exhausted. The individual is therefore also required to keep the demands of the task in mind for a 
longer period of time, which in turn places further demands on the executive system. Thus, 
category-fluency tasks reveal greater impairments because they  have more processing demands 
and require more executive control than other naming tasks.
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Other examples of dysfunctions of language-control processing in AD can be found 
within the grammatical competence literature. Emery (1982, 1985) examined syntactic deficits in 
AD and normal ageing. She administered a series of syntactic abilities tests to a sample of 
participants with AD and to age-matched and younger healthy controls. Emery found a gradual 
drop in performance on the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Exam from pre-middle age to old age and 
a dramatic decline in performance in the participants with AD. The participants with AD were 
least impaired at the phonological level (which tests the ability  to repeat sounds and words), and 
significantly more impaired at the morphological level (which tests comprehension of oral 
spelling). Emery also found that AD affected the ability  to comprehend passivizations and 
prepositions. Emery concluded that the pattern of degeneration was the reverse of the pattern of 
syntactic development in childhood, such that  the last of the linguistic functions to develop are 
the first to decline. Well-learned, automatic syntactic forms endure for longer in AD; in contrast, 
the syntactic forms that require non-automatic processing are likely to be the first to become 
unavailable. Kemper (1997) examined the ability  to detect simple syntactic violations. She found 
that as tasks made greater demands on working memory, the detection of syntactic anomaly 
declined in people with AD. Kemper concluded that grammatical processes relying most heavily 
on the working memory system are those most affected by ageing and particularly AD.
Self-awareness deficits in AD are also related to language-control processes. Loebel, 
Dager, Berg and Hyde (1990) found that participants who were less fluent speakers were more 
aware of their memory impairments, while the more fluent speakers were less aware of their 
memory deficits. One plausible interpretation of these results is that people with AD who are 
aware of their cognitive decline choose to say  less to avoid making errors. Further evidence of a 
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metalinguistic impairment in AD comes from studies of speech monitoring and repair. People 
with mild to moderate AD corrected only  24% of their speech errors compared with 92% by age-
matched controls (McNamara, Obler, Au, Durso, & Albert, 1992).
Papagno (2001) found figurative language was unaffected in the very early stages of AD, 
although impairments became apparent as the disease progressed. Participants with AD made 
more attempts to find the meaning of metaphors than they did for idioms, which Papagno 
attributed to the presence of semantic cues in metaphors. The comprehension of metaphors 
involves an active search of the specific semantic attributes of the words involved, and if these 
attributes can be accessed then comprehension is easier. In contrast, the meaning of idioms 
cannot be determined from their component words; instead its meaning is part of one’s general 
knowledge. The loss of figurative speech in AD therefore reflects in part an inability to 
manipulate language.
We have shown then that there is good reason to suppose that the processes that control 
language are disrupted by AD. Astell and Harley (2002) suggested that people with AD are 
sometimes impaired on word definition tasks because of a metalinguistic impairment. They 
found that although people with AD could produce some definitions of animate and inanimate 
items, the quality of their definitions was quite poor. Surprisingly, all three participant groups 
(age matched controls, younger adults and people with AD) provided better definitions for low-
frequency, atypical words than they did for high-frequency, typical items. This finding is counter 
to previous proposals that people with AD lose low-frequency atypical items first. Despite 
producing definitions that were categorised as inadequate, the definitions of participants with AD 
nevertheless contained some relevant information about the target. Astell and Harley claimed the 
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inability to produce the necessary requirements of a formal definition reflects not only a 
breakdown in language processing but also a breakdown in metalinguistic skill.
Our current study uses a word definition task to examine the extent to which 
metalinguistic function is affected by probable AD.
What makes a good definition? Good definitions adopt a common format based on an 
idealised form of definition called Aristotelian (Litowitz, 1977; Snow, 1990). Aristotelian 
definitions usually include a superordinate and a restrictive complement (e.g. “an island is a body 
of land surrounded by water”). In order to be able to provide a good definition, a speaker must 
know the appropriate category to which a word belongs and know the concept’s distinguishable 
characteristics (Marinellie & Johnson, 2002). A good definition must be informative and 
complete (Watson, 1985), yet it  must not be over-informative. The speaker has to know not to 
give redundant information (e.g. “a tiger is a big cat with stripes and is an animal with teeth”). 
The formation of a good definition needs metalinguistic knowledge: it requires an awareness of 
how to use language - particularly the knowledge of how to define. Furthermore, Litowitz (1977) 
found that adults who are able to define using the Aristotelian form can choose to produce 
definitions using lower-level categories or functional characteristics in situations where formal 
definitions are not required (e.g. defining a word to a friend). This adjustment of language to 
accommodate the listener’s needs is an important metalinguistic skill (Bialystok & Ryan, 1985).
The development of definitional skills is a measure of metalinguistic accomplishment in 
children (Snow, 1990). Children in the early stages of linguistic development provide definitions 
that are highly  personal (including references to themselves or their experiences), concrete and 
functional (Benelli, 1988). As the child grows older they start to use superordinate category 
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terms (Watson, 1995). The 6-7 year old child can readily generate superordinate information 
about some words (e.g. that a cat is an animal), but find generating more sophisticated 
superordinate categories (e.g. vehicle or utensil) much more difficult, requiring several years of 
experience and education before such terms can be used readily  (Snow, 1990). Despite not using 
superordinate categories in the early stages of their language development, children can 
understand them. Benelli (1988) and Watson (1985) found children who never used 
superordinate categories such as “animal” could nevertheless respond correctly  to questions such 
as “is a dog an animal?” Snow (1990) argued that the use of superordinate categories depends on 
knowledge of definitional forms – a skill that is not available in the early stages of cognitive 
development.
Any means of improving metalinguistic awareness improves definitional skills, including 
explicit  schooling. DeBaryshe and Whitehurst (1986) argued that the rehearsal of language 
allows more adult-like definitions to develop in children. They proposed the use of taxonomic 
categories and their relationships is a consequence of “intra-verbal learning”, whereby people 
learn about language through using language. As a consequence of the development of 
metalinguistic skills, children’s definitions become more adult-like.
Clearly then defining a word contains a large element of metalinguistic skill. The purpose 
of this research is to identify if metalinguistic function is affected by AD. The widespread 
damage of moderate AD must lead to an impairment of the routes that support  the executive 
processes underpinning metalinguistic processing, and therefore people with AD will have 
restricted metalinguistic ability. As a result, people with AD will find producing formal 
definitions difficult.
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We expect that the performance of people with AD will share features of children in a 
pre-metalinguistic stage of language development. We expect fewer superordinate, taxonomic 
elements (e.g. “a dog is an animal”), perceptual elements (e.g. “a pig has a curly tail”), and 
functional elements (e.g. “a kettle is used to boil water”). We also predict that people with AD 
will produce more associative and personal elements (e.g. “I like horses” or “I just bought a new 
cooker”). Our most important prediction, however, is that although AD disrupts metalinguistic 
processing, the relevant semantic information need not also be lost. Hence people with AD will 
reveal knowledge under questioning that they do not produce spontaneously.
We also take this opportunity  to examine differences in definitions for animate and 
inanimate objects. The pattern of performance on naming living and non-living things in people 
with AD is complex (Harley & Grant, 2004), but little is known at all about corresponding 
pattern of performance in the definitions task.
Experiment 1 generated a set of normative definitions of 32 words to be used in the main 
study. Experiment 2 tested our participants’ ability to define and name these items, and then 
whether they still knew information they did not provide in their spontaneous definitions.





In this experiment healthy  young adults generated definitions of 32 target words. These 
definitions were then used to generate high- and low-frequency definitional elements. The 
elements were then used to devise a set of open- and forced-choice questions to test the 
knowledge of participants with AD in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
Ten participants generated our sample of definitions. All of the participants were aged 
between 18 and 57 and matched in years of education to the participants in Experiments 2 and 3. 
None of the participants suffered from AD or any other neurological disease.
Materials
The target stimuli were 16 animate and 16 inanimate words taken from Harley  and Grant 
(2004). The pictures were matched as far as possible for name agreement, familiarity, and visual 
complexity. See Appendix 1 for the list of words.
Procedure
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Participants wrote a formal definition of each of the 32 target words. They were told that 
their definition should enable someone who did not know the word to be able to identify it from 
their descriptions. Participants were tested individually and were given as much time as they 
needed; no one took longer than 45 minutes.
Results and discussion
We divided each definition into definitional elements. We scored each definition for the 
number of elements produced and for the frequency of mention of individual elements across 
participants. The highest frequency of mention of a definitional element was 10 (e.g. all 10 
participants stated that a frog is green), and the lowest 3.
The words varied in the amount of agreement demonstrated by participants. For example, 
only 6 definitional elements were provided in total for “tractor” with very little agreement 
between participants. In contrast, 19 definitional elements were generated for the word “frog” 
with very high agreement. We used the elements with the highest agreement and frequency of 
mention to generate a set of forced-choice (e.g. “is a frog green?”) and open-choice questions 
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Seven people with AD took part in this experiment (5 males and 2 females). The mean 
age of the people with AD participants was 78.3 years (SD = 4.7), with a mean of 11.6 years of 
formal education (SD = 1.3). Neurologists confirmed all of the participants’ clinical diagnosis of 
AD using examinations and evaluations from the Work Group of the National Institute of 
Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke (NINCDS) and the Alzheimer’s disease 
and Related Disorders Association (ADRDA: McKahnn, Drachman, Folstein, Katzman, Price & 
Stadlan, 1984). The participants showed no signs of vascular dementia. The mean score of the 
participants with AD was 18.17 (SD = 5.5, range 9 to 25) on the Mini-Mental State Examination 
(Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), showing that our participants fell in the mild-to-moderate 
range of cognitive decline.
The control group comprised seven healthy  older adults (HOA). Their mean age of was 
80.0 (SD = 3.6), with a mean of 12.0 years of formal education (SD = 2.0); they were all female. 
The mean MMSE score for the HOA participants was 28.14 (SD = 1.1; range 26 to 29).
Participant information data is summarised in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
The HOA and AD groups were matched for age (Mann-Whitney  U = 19.00, N1 = 7, N2 = 
7, p = 0.535, two-tailed) and years of education (U = 22.00, N1 = 7, N2 = 7, p = 0.805, two-
tailed). There was, unsurprisingly, a significant difference between the participant groups’ 
MMSE scores (U = 0, N1 = 7, N2 = 7, p = 0.001, two-tailed).
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Materials
The stimuli for the definitions task comprised 16 animate and 16 inanimate words taken 
from Harley and Grant (2004), as used in Experiment 1. For each there were six questions 
comprising three open-choice questions (e.g. “what do chickens lay?”) and three forced-choice 
questions (e.g. “do we eat chickens?”), also as described in Experiment 1.
For the naming task, we used pictures of most of these items. The stimuli comprised 
twenty-nine pictures from Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) standardised black-and-white line 
drawings and an artist drew, in the same style as the Snodgrass and Vanderwart corpus, a picture 
of a ladybird. Two of the inanimate items do not appear in the Snodgrass and Vanderwart set 
(tractor and washing machine), and producing these pictures in the style of the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart corpus proved too difficult. The pictures were presented on 6” x 6” white cards, with 
the pictures centred on the card and enlarged to font size 72.
Procedure
The participants were told that they were going to hear some words and instructed to 
describe the word’s meaning so that someone who had never heard or seen the word before could 
identify the item from their description. The participants were then given a practice word and 
were asked to define this word. They  were then told that they would also be asked some 
questions about the word they were defining.
The words were presented verbally, one at a time and in a random order. Once the 
participant produced their definition they  were asked “Is that everything you would like to say 
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about -?” When they indicated their definition was complete they  were then asked three forced-
choice and three open-choice questions about the word they had just defined, in a random order.
The participants with AD were tested in three sessions, and the HOA participants in two 
sessions, over a three-week period. Each session took under 40 minutes. All of the participants 
took part in a follow-up  session two weeks later. In this session all of the participants were tested 
to see if they could identify the correct word from their own definitions.
Two independent judges scored every definition produced by both groups. They rated the 
definitions as adequate or inadequate. A third judge made the final decision if there was 
disagreement between the judges. The same two judges also identified definitional elements in 
the definitions generated by  the participants and assigned each of these to the categories of 
taxonomic, perceptual, functional, associative or other. When there was disagreement between 
the judges the third judge made the final decision. The judges were not told whether they were 
judging the definitions of someone with AD or someone from the control group.
The participants named the 30 pictures after they had finished the word definitions task. 
The pictures were presented sequentially  in a random order. The task took approximately five 
minutes to complete.
Results and Discussion
The general level of definitional ability  of the participants with AD was poor. They 
provided fewer definitional elements and less adequate definitions for both animate and 
inanimate words than the HOA participants.
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Quantity of definitional material produced for both animate and inanimate words
The amount of definitional material produced by both groups is summarised in Table 2. 
We carried out two Kruskall-Wallis tests in order to identify any  affect of group (HOA & AD) on 
animacy  (total number of definitional elements produced for animate & inanimate words). We 
found a significant effect of group on total number of definitional elements produced for animate 
words (χ2 = 9.036, df = 1, p < 0.005) and inanimate words (χ2 = 8.656, df = 1, p < 0.005). Both 
groups produced more definitional elements for animate items compared with inanimate items 
(for the AD participants, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test z = 2.37, N – ties =7, p < 0.02, two-tailed; 
for the HOA participants, Wilcoxon signed-ranks test z = 2.37, N – ties =7, p < 0.02, two-tailed). 
Insert Table 2 about here
Adequacy of definitional material for both animate and inanimate words
The adequacy of the definitions for each group is summarised in Table 3. We carried out a 
2 x 2 mixed ANOVA, with two levels of group (HOA and AD) and two levels of word type 
(inanimate and animate), on the number of adequate definitions produced. Again there was a 
significant main effect  of group (F (1, 12) = 49.23, p < 0.001), but here there was no effect of 
word type (F (1, 12) = 0.055, p > 0.05) and no interaction (F (1, 12) = 0.219, p > 0.05). Mann-
Whitney tests revealed significant differences between the levels of adequacy  of the HOA and 
AD groups for their definitions of both animate (U = 0.0, N1 = 7, N2 = 7, p = 0.001) and 
inanimate words (U = 0.0, N1 = 7, N2 = 7, p = 0.001).
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Insert Table 3 about here
Detailed analysis of definitional elements for inanimate words
We carried out a 2 x 5 mixed ANOVA, with two levels of group (HOA and AD) and five 
levels of type of element (taxonomic, perceptual, functional, associative and other), on the 
number of definitional elements produced for words denoting inanimate things. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant  main effect of group (F (1,12) = 19.77, p  < 0.001) and of type of 
definitional element (F (4, 33.15) = 12.26, p < 0.001). There was a significant interaction 
between group and element type (F (4, 33.15) = 5.04, p < 0.01). In summary, the participants 
with AD produced fewer taxonomic, perceptual, functional, and other types of definitional 
element for inanimate items than the HOA participants. Importantly, as predicted, the interaction 
reveals that participants with AD produced more personal and associative elements and fewer 
taxonomic elements (see Figure 1).
Insert Figure 1 about here
Analysis of definitional elements for animate words
A similar 2 x 5 mixed ANOVA on the number of elements produced for words denoting 
animate things revealed a significant main effect of group (F (1,12) = 22.439, p < 0.001) and of 
definitional element type (F (4, 25.08) = 9.15, p < 0.001). There was no significant interaction 
between group and definitional element type (F (4, 25.08) = 1.808, p > 0.05). The results are 
broadly  similar as for inanimate words (see Figure 2). However, Figures 1 and 2 show that the 
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participants with AD were better at producing taxonomic and perceptual elements for animate 
words than they were for inanimate words.
Insert Figure 2 about here
So far we have found that the AD definitions are inadequate in ways we predicted on the 
basis of impaired metalinguistic ability. We now explore whether participants can supply 
information they did not provide in their definitions.
Evidence of preserved definitional knowledge not spontaneously produced
Can the participants with AD correctly answer questions about material that they do not 
produce spontaneously in their definitions? The percentages of each type of question answered 
correctly by each group is shown in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
A Mann-Whitney  test showed that the participants with AD answered significantly fewer 
questions correctly  than the HOA participants (U = 0.0, N1 = 7, N2 = 7, p = 0.001). The key 
finding, however, is that the participants with AD could indeed supply a great deal of information 
that they  did not offer in their spontaneous definitions. If we restrict the analysis to just the 
inadequate definitions produced by  the AD group, the participants still got 46.9% of the open-
Impaired metalinguistic knowledge in dementia
21
choice questions and 85.5% of the forced-choice questions correct. Therefore the poor 
definitions cannot arise as a consequence of the loss of semantic knowledge alone.
Did the participants with AD simply make successful guesses? The magnitude of the 
effect makes this most unlikely. The AD group  on average got  over half the open-choice 
questions correct – an extraordinarily  high level of performance. Although the performance of 
the AD group was variable (range correct 8.4% to 86.3%), even the lowest-scoring participant 
with AD knew information that they did not provide in their spontaneous definitions. 
Furthermore, 5 out of the 7 participants with AD got over half the open-choice questions right.
We analysed the responses to the forced-choice questions to ensure that the hit rate was 
above chance. A simple analysis shows that the participants with AD got on average 84% of the 
questions correct when the chance rate is 50%. A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test showed that the 
number of times the participants with AD appropriately responded with “no” answers was 
significantly greater than the number of times they inappropriately  responded with “yes” answers 
(z = 2.232, N – Ties = 6, p = 0.026, two-tailed). The calculation of the odds ratio revealed that 
the participants with AD were 3.7 times more likely to make an appropriate “no” response than 
they  were to make an inappropriate “yes” response. Likewise, the number of times the 
participants with AD appropriately responded with “yes” answers was significantly greater than 
the number of times they  inappropriately responded with “no” answers (z = 2.384, N – Ties = 7, 
p = 0.017, two-tailed). The calculation of the odds ratio revealed that  the participants with AD 
were 5.9 times more likely to make an appropriate “yes” response than they were to make an 
inappropriate “no” response. These findings show that the AD group’s responses reflect informed 
choices and not guessing.
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Effects of severity
Although we are considering just small numbers of participants here, it is worth 
considering how the severity  of AD affects performance. The more severe AD participants (n = 
2) had MMSE scores of 9 and 15, and the less severe AD participants (n = 5) had MMSE scores 
between 19 and 25.  The more severe AD participants produced no adequate definitions and the 
less severe AD participants produced a mean of 7.0 (SD = 4.1) adequate definitions. For, the 
inanimate items, the more severe AD participants produced a mean of 22.0 (SD = 5.6) and the 
less severe participants a mean of 30.4 (SD = 0.1) definitional elements. For the animate items, 
the more severe AD participants produced a mean of 33.0 (SD = 2.7) definitional elements, and 
the less severe participants produced a mean of 45.0 (SD = 5.4) definitional elements. 
On the forced-choice/open-ended question component of the definitions experiment the 
more severe AD participants answered a total mean of 103.0 (SD = 55.2) questions correctly and 
the less severe participants answered a total mean of 141.6 (SD = 33.1) questions correctly.
Picture Naming
All of the HOA participants named all of the pictures correctly. The naming performance 
of the AD group was relatively  good; they named a mean number of 24.0 (SD = 5.9) pictures 
correctly  (ranging from 40% to 96.7% correct.). The difference in naming performance between 
the two groups was significant (Mann-Whitney U = 0.0, N1 = 7, N2 = 7, p = 0.001).
In the AD group, there was no significant difference in naming performance for animate 
and inanimate items. The participants with AD correctly named a mean of 12.6 animate pictures 
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(SD = 3.2) and 12.0 (SD = 2.9) inanimate pictures (z = 0.966, N – Ties = 5, p = 0.334, two-
tailed).
Naming in response to self-generated definitions
The participants with AD correctly identified a mean of 6.6 (SD = 6.2) target words from 
their own definitions; the corresponding figure for the HOA participants was 27.9 (SD = 5.6). A 
Mann-Whitney test showed that difference between the two groups was significant (U = 0.5, N1 
= 7, N2 = 7, p = 0.001). There was no relationship between the number of associative definitional 
elements produced in the AD participants’ definitions and the subsequent likelihood of the 
participants being able to identify the target word from their own definition for animate (τ = 
0.00, N = 7, p > 0.05, two-tailed) or inanimate (τ = 0.205, N = 7, p  > 0.05, two-tailed) items. 
Exactly  why some people with AD could identify the target  words from their own definitions 
when others could not is worthy  of further investigation. It is possible that  when people with AD 
successfully  identified the target from one of their own, inadequate definitions they relied on the 
presence of particularly notable personal information. For example, here is an example of a 
definition generated by someone with AD and rated “inadequate” by judges, but which enabled 
the participant to identify the target word two weeks later:
“We used to have one. We had a man out to butcher it. People used to have them hanging 
on their ceiling. They called them hams; they are cured and kept for a long time”.
Qualitative analyses
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Only one out of the seven participants with AD could name the picture of a ladybird. 
Only one participant answered most of the questions about the ladybird correctly and none of the 
participants could provide a formal definition of a ladybird. Participants produced definitions 
such as “a beautiful bird with green and blue feathers” or “a bird with brown spots”. These 
difficulties might arise because “ladybird” also has few close semantic neighbours few, if any, 
functions and only two principal perceptual features (red and black spots).
There was evidence of tip-of-the-tongue states in some of the participants with AD. For 
example, when asked the definition of a television, one person with AD said “I know what it is, it 
is a tele..f, it is a tele.., you know, one of those you know”.
Other participants with AD made semantic errors such as naming the zebra as a horse or 
naming the goat as a dog. One participant described a tractor as “like a train”. Other people in the 
AD group digressed from the focus of the task. One participant offered the following definition 
of a horse: “You can win a lot of money  on them”, but then went on to tell a long story  about a 
bet he once made. Such observations further suggest that people with AD have difficulty 
remembering the demands of the task and fail not just because of a lack semantic knowledge but 
because of lack of metalinguistic knowledge.
General discussion
Our results show that people with probable AD suffer from a metalinguistic impairment 
in addition to any  loss of semantic knowledge. Our participants with AD were able to answer 
correctly  open-choice and forced-choice questions pertaining to definitional information they did 
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not provide spontaneously. Hence semantic degradation by itself cannot explain our participants’ 
poor definitional performance.
The definitions of our AD participants were poor because they  tended not to produce the 
appropriate taxonomic information (the superordinate category  of the word to be defined) and 
instead produced too much associative (e.g. personal) information. Our data show that much of 
the information was nevertheless still available to the participants. Both of these failings arise 
from failures of non-automatic processing. We argue that our participants failed to produce 
sufficient taxonomic information because they have lost the metalinguistic knowledge about 
what constitutes a good definition. In many respects our participants with AD behaved like 
young children who have yet to master the metalinguistic skills with which to organise their 
knowledge and are therefore unable to produce sophisticated definitions. However, just like our 
AD group, although young children fail to make use of super-order categories in their 
definitions, they can answer questions indicating that they have knowledge of the information 
that they omit.
We also found that the participants with AD used more associative and personal 
information in their definitions than did the HOA participants. We suggest that this finding also 
reflects a decline in controlled processing. Poor inhibitory control is often characteristic of AD 
(Spieler, Balota & Faust, 1996) and also, to a lesser extent, normal ageing (e.g. Arbuckle & Gold, 
1993; Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Rympa, 1991; Mayr, 2001). This increased production of 
associative elements is also suggestive of poor metalinguistic functioning. A good definition 
must be informative, but also requires the speaker to have an awareness of what the listener 
needs to know. An adult  with good metalinguistic competence will make judgements about how 
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to define a word. For example, as we noted in the introduction, in situations where a formal 
definition is required the adult will choose an Aristotelian form; however when speaking to a 
friend, where formal definitions are not required, the adult will use lower-level categories or 
functional characteristics (Litowitz, 1977). The ability to make this judgement relies on 
metalinguistic information and the ability to model the knowledge of the listener. The AD 
group’s increased use of personal information suggests a breakdown in these types of skill.
We also found that differences in the ability to define animate and inanimate items, 
although as ever, the pattern of effects was complex. Generally participants performed better 
with the animate items. Participants with AD are particularly poor at taxonomic (superordinate) 
information for members of inanimate categories. Categories such as “furniture” or “utensil” are 
more sophisticated and taught to children in school much later than categories such as 
“animal” (Snow, 1990).
In summary, we have shown that  people with AD can sometimes access semantic 
information that they at first sight appear to have lost. They  do not  always offer this information 
spontaneously  because of a metalinguistic problem associated with a lack of executive control 
and caused by disruption to the frontal pathways resulting from cortical atrophy. This finding has 
obvious implications for the treatment and quality  of life of people with AD; rather than 
assuming material is lost, it is prudent to try a different task – or a different approach to the same 
task – to access knowledge in case it  is spared. Of course, the sample size is relatively small and 
some caution in extrapolating the results necessary, but it is clear that we cannot assume that 
people with AD do not know simply because they do not tell.
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Tractor (not used in Experiment 2)
Washing Machine (not used in Experiment 
2)
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Table 1. Summary of participant data.
Participants Age MMSE Years education Picture naming
HOA
NB 75 29 11 30
MSH 79 28 14 30
MSG 81 29 11 30
JM 82 29 14 30
LC 86 29 14 30
MJ 77 28 9 30
WB 80 26 11 30
AD
GP 80 15 11 24
JM 71 9 11 12
SJ 81 19 12 29
MRG 74 20 12 29
JA 82 25 11 28
MM 70 22 10 26
AM 82 21 14 24
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Table 2. Mean number of definitional elements produced by AD and HOA groups for animate 
and inanimate targets.
Number of definitional elements for 
animate words
Number of definitional elements for 
inanimate words
AD Group 41.6 (SD 14.8) 28.0 (SD 11.2)
HOA Group 97.4 (SD 25.6) 67.6 (SD 20.7)
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Table 3. Comparison of mean adequacy judgements for definitions of animate and inanimate 
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Table 4. Percentage number of open-choice and forced-choice questions answered correctly for 
each group.
Open-choice questions Forced-choice questions
AD 51.4 84
HOA 100 100
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Figure legends
Figure 1. Comparison of types of definitional elements generated for inanimate items
Figure 2. Comparison of types of definitional elements generated for animate items
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